


## Last-Hop Wireless Networks

Wireless LANs (e.g., 802.11x)  
Cellular (e.g., GSM)  
Bluetooth, Infrared, RFID, etc.

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## Last-Hop Wireless

- ❑ Rely on extensive infrastructure
- ❑ Usually, only last hop is wireless
- ❑ Only end-node is mobile



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## What security needed?

- ❑ End-node access control
- ❑ End-node  $\leftrightarrow$  infrastructure authentication
- ❑ Encrypted, authenticated communication
- ❑ Anonymity/Pseudonymity: who is this end-node? Where does he move from/to?
  - From infrastructure?
  - From others (eavesdroppers)?

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## 802.11 security (Kurose/Ross Ch. 8)

- ❑ *war-driving*: drive around your city/neighborhood, see what 802.11 networks available?
  - Many are accessible from public spaces
  - Most don't use encryption/authentication
  - Packet-sniffing and various other attacks are easy!
    - Eavesdropping, spoofing, bw consumption (DoS), framing!
- ❑ *securing 802.11*
  - encryption, authentication
  - first attempt at 802.11 security - Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP): a failure
  - current approach: 802.11i

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## Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP):

- ❑ Simple authentication:
  - host requests authentication from access point
  - access point sends 128-bit nonce (random number)
  - host encrypts nonce using shared symmetric key
  - access point decrypts nonce, authenticates host
- ❑ no key distribution mechanism
- ❑ authentication: knowing the shared key is enough (assumed host already knows shared key)


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## WEP data encryption

- ❑ Host & AP share a 40-bit symmetric key
- ❑ In each frame, host appends a 24-bit initialization vector (IV) to create a 64-bit key
- ❑ 64-bit key used to generate a key-stream:  $k_i^{IV}$
- ❑  $k_i^{IV}$  used to encrypt i-th byte,  $d_i$ , in frame:
$$c_i = d_i \text{ XOR } k_i^{IV}$$
- ❑ IV and encrypted bytes,  $c_i$  sent in frame

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## 802.11 WEP encryption



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## Breaking 802.11 WEP encryption

### security hole:

- ❑ 24-bit IV, one IV per frame  $\rightarrow$  IV-s eventually reused
- ❑ IV transmitted in plaintext  $\rightarrow$  IV reuse detected

### ❑ attack:

- Eve causes Alice to encrypt known plaintext:  $d_1 d_2 d_3 d_4$
- ...
- Eve sees:  $c_i = d_i \text{ XOR } k_i^{IV}$
- Eve knows  $c_i d_i$ , so can compute  $k_i^{IV}$
- Eve knows encrypting key sequence  $k_1^{IV} k_2^{IV} k_3^{IV} \dots$
- Next time same IV is used, Eve can decrypt!


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## 802.11i: improved security

- ❑ numerous (stronger) forms of encryption possible
- ❑ provides key distribution
- ❑ uses authentication server distinct from access point

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
## 802.11i: four phases of operation



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## EAP: Extensible Authentication Protocol

- ❑ EAP: end-end client (mobile) to authentication server protocol
- ❑ EAP sent over separate "links"
  - mobile-to-AP (EAP over LAN)
  - AP to authentication server (RADIUS over UDP)



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
## GSM Security

- ❑ Good overview of GSM Security:

[http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/~sans/students\\_lectures/GSM%20Security.ppt](http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/~sans/students_lectures/GSM%20Security.ppt)

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## GSM Architecture



## Authentication & Encryption

